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political relationship with each nation, a
detailed account of the bases acquired, a
shrewd analysis of the various quarrels
that emerged, and a careful description
of the changes that occurred over the
fifty years covered by this book. With
some nations, such as Japan, the security
relationship displayed a remarkable continuity, while in others, such as Panama
and the Philippines, growing nationalist
tensions forced the United States eventually to close its bases. America’s relationships with Greece, Spain, and Turkey,
new allies in the Mediterranean, were always filled with difficulties, while the
United States was never able to obtain
access to permanent bases in the Middle
East. In this area of the world it had to
rely on mobile forces and the
prepositioning of military equipment.
By the mid-1980s America’s leasehold
empire was under serious strain, beset by
nationalist pressures and by what some
scholars described as imperial overreach.
Sandars believes that critics like Paul
Kennedy overemphasized the gap between American resources and obligations, and failed to anticipate the end of
the Cold War, the revival of the American economy in the 1990s, and the agility
with which the United States adjusted to
the new international environment and
redefined its informal empire. Between
1989 and 1995 the number of U.S. troops
permanently based overseas fell over 50
percent, from 510,000 to 238,000.
Sandars speculates that America’s leasehold empire will last, on a reduced scale,
far into the new century. “After a long
period of mismatch,” he writes, “the demands of the U.S. global security system
and the resources to sustain it are now
back in equilibrium.” He is convinced
that the benefits of this worldwide system
of military bases far outweigh the costs,
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and he praises the accomplishments of
American foreign policy in the second
half of the twentieth century. The United
States, he concludes, “has emerged with
credit and honor from this unique experiment of policing the world, not by imposing garrisons on occupied territory,
but by agreement with her friends and
allies.”
CHARLES E. NEU

Brown University

Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Keystone: The American
Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000.
264pp. $34.95

In the after-action report on the U.S. occupation of the Rhineland following
World War I, Colonel I. L. Hunt wrote,
“The history of the United States offers
an uninterrupted series of wars, which
demanded as their aftermath, the exercise
by its officers of civil government functions.” “Despite the[se] precedents,” he
lamented, “the lesson seemingly has not
been learned.” The military returned to
this tradition of forgetting after World
War II. Subsequent to that second global
conflict, U.S. forces assumed responsibility for over two hundred million people
in occupation zones in Asia and Europe
at a cost of over a billion dollars a year,
yet official military histories barely touch
the topic. Texas A&M University professor
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes steps in to fill
part of the void with a thought-provoking
case study of the American occupation of
Okinawa from 1945 to the island’s formal return to Japanese sovereignty in
1972. Sarantakes’s thesis is that bureaucratic infighting shaped the course of the
occupation as much as did national
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security strategy and foreign policy. This
finding parallels other research on U.S.
postwar operations.
Sarantakes begins his narrative with the
1 April 1945 amphibious assaults launching Operation ICEBERG, an imperfect but
ultimately successful campaign. This
story has already been well told (particularly in George Feifer’s Tennozan: The
Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb
[1992]), but Sarantakes’s version is
briskly written and engaging. His purpose in beginning with the fight for the
island is to illustrate the interservice disagreements that marred operations—difficulties, he argues, that foreshadowed
future problems.
The fundamental obstacle, Sarantakes
finds, was that the United States lacked
an overarching strategy for what to do
with the islands. Normally, the military
wanted to jettison occupation duties as
quickly as possible; Okinawa was a rare
exception. Both the Army and the Navy
saw the island as a potential base from
which to guard against a resurgent Japan
or uncooperative Soviet Union. After a
few typhoons demonstrated the vulnerability of harbor facilities, the Navy
dropped its interest in Okinawa. The
Army, however, saw utility in staging
troops and bombers on the island and assumed overall control of the occupation.
An Army commander was appointed
high commissioner, making him the senior U.S. military, political, and diplomatic representative.
The dynamics driving the occupation of
Okinawa bear striking resemblance to
other major postwar peacekeeping and
nation-building efforts, in Germany, Italy,
Austria, Japan proper, and Korea. In the
early years, 1945–48, high commissioners
had a great deal of autonomy in shaping
and implementing policies. At the same
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time, they had scant resources for managing the occupations, with the result
that their efforts to rebuild countries, institute the rule of law, and reconstruct
civil societies were limited. In addition,
commanders faced such challenges as
monetary reform, black-market activity,
crime by occupation troops and civilians,
housing shortages, poor race relations,
and forces ill prepared, inadequately
trained, and ineptly organized for occupation duties.
As the Cold War heated up, the U.S.
State Department took the lead in setting
occupation policies. Most high commissioners became civilians; again Okinawa
was a notable exception. The Department
of State and the Pentagon were often at
odds. The military wanted to hold forward bases like Okinawa, while the State
Department lobbied to withdraw troops
in order to build up good will with fledgling Cold War allies. The debate over
Okinawa was a case in point. Sarantakes
documents well the titanic 1961–64
struggle between the U.S. ambassador to
Japan, Edwin Reischauer, and General
Paul Caraway, U.S. Army, the commander of forces on the island.
The Cold War stimulated overseas investment in strategic areas and kept the
troops in place. These commitments allowed for the eventual stability, security,
and economic development that would
have shortened the requirement for occupation in the first place. These bases
did serve their intended purpose. Okinawa was a key support facility during
the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and then
the major staging base for Marine forces
(a role that it continues to play).
The belated return of the island to Japan
in 1972 concluded an arguably successful
but, as Sarantakes demonstrates, troubled
occupation. His research suggests
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important lessons for the practitioners of
military operations other than war. Effective peacekeeping and nation building
are not cheap, easy, or brief, but their execution can be greatly facilitated by competent, cohesive, and effective
interservice and interagency teams.
JAMES JAY CARAFANO

Executive Editor
Joint Force Quarterly

Paul, Septimus H. Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American
Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus: Ohio State
Univ. Press, 2000. 266pp. $42.50

With the collapse of Soviet power and the
end of the Cold War, the paradigm that
helped to explain that era shifted. Scholars
seeking to understand better the period
are now free to reassess that era, taking
into account other variables in the power
calculus with the same degree of attention previously concentrated upon the
Soviet Union. To cite just one example of
this paradigm shift, since the opening of
recent British archives scholars have concluded that British foreign and defense
policy had a much more decisive impact
on the early Cold War than was apparent
in earlier considerations. The new study
by Septimus H. Paul is one such
reassessment.
Paul is a professor of history at the College of Lake County in Grayslake, Illinois.
His Nuclear Rivals is a meticulous examination of Anglo-American wartime collaboration in the development of the
atomic bomb, followed by the decision of
the United States after the war to deny
Great Britain the fruits of that collaboration—the requisite technologies to build
a British atomic bomb. To British eyes,
this was a betrayal of solemn (if secret)
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promises made by President Franklin
Roosevelt to Prime Minister Winston
Churchill during the war and of understandings between President Harry Truman
and Prime Minister Clement Attlee
afterward.
Part of the complexity of Anglo-American
relations is to be explained by their
multileveled nature. The alliance against
Hitler during World War II forged a
common front, which coexisted with
substantive differences over grand strategy and the postwar political-economic
settlement, particularly on questions relating to open markets and decolonization. The desire of the British to exercise
joint partnership with the United States
in the monopoly of the atomic bomb,
and the American reluctance to do so,
proved to be particularly divisive. These
profound differences continued into the
postwar world but were overshadowed by
the American and British governments’
perceived fear of the common threat
from Soviet Russia. One of the truly valuable contributions of Nuclear Rivals is
Paul’s fidelity to this complexity and to
the sources in relating the story of American collaboration and noncollaboration
with Britain in atomic weapons development. Paul makes no attempt to sweeten
or marginalize the differences between
the two nations in this area; his approach
is explicit, without attention to peripheral issues.
The major contribution of this book is its
attention to what used to be called in the
literature “the raw materials question.”
This relates to the American attempt during World War II to secure a monopoly
of the world’s uranium supply. One complication for the Americans was that the
source of the highest-quality uranium,
absolutely indispensable for building an
atomic bomb, was the then Belgian
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